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EARL F. NELSON LECTURE: LAW,
TECHNOLOGY, AND LIBERTY
LEE LOEVINGER*
From Eisenhower to Reagan-it is a span of only 20 years, yet a period of
change so dramatic that it has left many Americans both dazzled and bewil-
dered. In virtually no aspect of life does the U.S. of the early 1980s resemble
what it was in the relatively simple days of the late 1950s. What's more, the
pace of change will quicken as the turn of the century approaches . . . People
from every age and racial group are staggered and challenged by rapid tech-
nological advancements, especially the computer. Cancer, heart disease and
other killers are less of a threat as medical breakthroughs extend lifespans.1
Thus begins the cover story in U.S. News and World Report for March
19, 1984. It, like other news magazines and newspapers, chronicles the observ-
able changes in contemporary social behavior and structure, but without much
analysis of the underlying conditions that have given rise to the observable
changes. I think that a more analytical examination will disclose that most of
the observable social forces now operating in society are the result of changes
in basic living conditions brought about by technological developments.
In the last century, a fictional story of a man who traveled Around the
World in Eighty Days2 was exciting-and fanciful. Today anyone with air-
plane fare can do it in eighty hours-or less. The average family nightly
watches scenes on its home television set of events that took place that day on
other continents, and sporting events in the antipodes are brought to us as they
occur. Anyone with a telephone can call any city in the world and within one
or two minutes be speaking to someone at the place called.
Yet, even as we calmly enjoy these marvels, new wonders are being fash-
ioned and presented to us. Banks are selling securities and putting automated
tellers in grocery stores and other places. Stockbrokers are managing cash ac-
counts, with computerized accounting that shifts funds back and forth between
securities and interest bearing deposits daily. Those with the proper plastic
cards can get cash or travelers checks from machines in airports and other
public places. Literally billions of dollars are transferred daily between banks
by electronic connection. The whole financial world is facing radical transfor-
mation as a result of the impact of developing technology. We are promised
* Attorney and Partner, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.; B.A. Univer-
sity of Minnesota, 1933; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1936. Commissioner, Federal
Communications Commission, 1963-68; Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, 1961-63; Associate Justice, Minnesota Supreme Court, 1960-61.
1. U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Mar. 19, 1984, at 40.
2. The title of a book by Jules Verne published in 1872.
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that the ordinary consumer will soon get services, including banking service,
through his home television set. It is said that newspaper publishers, banks,
and retailers will be in competition to sell services that enable people to make
purchases, check bank balances, and buy and sell stocks using only a special
terminal attached to their telephone at home. Some such systems are already
in experimental operation, and both England and France have systems operat-
ing on a commercial basis.:
Even greater wonders are promised for the near future. Already being
advertised is a filing system that will store data on a laser optical memory disc,
which will be able to record and store all the information on a million sheets of
letter size paper, the equivalent of all the records an average businessman pro-
duces in 30 years, in an area smaller than a hat box.4 Now commonplace is
the ubiquitous credit card, which was virtually unknown a couple of decades
ago. It is simply impossible to briefly recount the changes that modern tech-
nology has brought in our lives, since these affect everything from the clothes
we wear, the food we eat, and the work we do, to the way we are born, the
medical treatment we receive, and the length of our lives.
But before we become too impressed with the technological achievements
and social reforms of our own age, we might take a look at some earlier peri-
ods of history. The technology of the industrial revolution, which began in
England in the eighteenth century, brought changes to the life of America in
the last half of the nineteenth century that probably seemed more radical and
turbulent to the people of that time than contemporary change appears to
most of us today. The nature of society itself changed in the nineteenth cen-
tury from a rural agricultural society in which the majority of workers were
employed on farms, to a rapidly growing industrial society in which the major-
ity of workers toiled in factories. In the latter half of the nineteenth century,
the industrial revolution changed the methods of farming itself. Tractors and
tractor-drawn machines rapidly began to replace horse-drawn machinery and
manpower. Farmers began to use combines to reap and thresh grain in one
operation, and other machines to pick corn, harvest cotton, plant seeds, and
spread fertilizer. Great industries that have lasted to this day developed: the
textile industry with all of its complex automated operations from picking cot-
ton and separating the fiber from the seeds, to spinning thread and weaving
cloth; the steel industry; mining; meatpacking; petroleum; railroads; tobacco;
telegraph and telephone. These developments were accompanied by social tur-
moil at least as great as that we now observe. There were enormous, bloody
strikes, literally armed warfare between labor and industry. The cities teemed
with waves of new immigrants, and political bosses built powerful machines in
the major cities. The abolition movement and the Civil War abolished slavery.
Reformers like Lucy Stone and Susan B. Anthony started a vigorous women's
3. Mayer, Coming Fast; Services Through The TV Set, FORTUNE, Nov. 14,
1983, at 50.
4. Advertisement of Matsushita Electronics.
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rights movement, which is still vigorous today. Henry George advocated radi-
cal reform of the tax system, with a single tax based primarily on the value of
land.
The ideas and causes advocated by the nineteenth century reformers were
not entirely new. Few ideas for social reform are. What made ideas of the
nineteenth century reformers socially significant and powerful were the social
conditions created by the scientific discoveries and the technological develop-
ments growing out of them during the preceding decades and centuries. There
are no new chapters in human history. All that happens is related to what
went before. Society reflects technology, which rests upon science, which is
simply a particular aspect of the disciplined human mind. Were we not so
engrossed in our own lives and problems, we would probably acknowledge that
the greatest intellectual achievements of the human race were made centuries
or millenia ago.
Language is surely the most basic and essential of the intellectual tools
we have inherited from our ancestors. Its origin is shrouded in the mists of
prehistory, and it may have developed over a very long period of time, but it
was surely a product of the human mind. The reduction of language to writing
was another giant intellectual step forward in early human history. The earli-
est writing was that of the Sumerians in Babylonia, about 5,000 years ago. In
contrast, the invention of printing is relatively recent. Johannes Gutenberg de-
vised movable type about 1440. The first printing press in America was set up
in 1639. The rotary press was invented in this country in 1845, and xerogra-
phy, the now commonplace printing process, was invented in 1937.
Without attempting to review the history of science or technology, let us
remind ourselves of a few of the great inventions of earlier ages which have
provided the foundation of modern technology: the wheel, the screw, Euclidian
geometry, Arabic numerals, calculus, Newtonian physics. Like Newton, the
scientists and technologists of our age stand on the shoulders of the intellectual
giants who preceded them. Likewise, modern technology was founded on in-
ventions of the preceding century: the steam engine, the Bessemer process, the
telegraph and telephone, the internal combustion engine, Einsteinian physics,
electric lights, radio, and automobiles.
Even such a cursory review should remind us that science and technology
are not separate fields, but merely different aspects of the same discipline.
Technology is applied science. Science is the theoretical and research phase of
technology. Modern scientific research, from experimentation with subatomic
particles to observation of galaxies, stars and quasars at the outermost edge of
the observable universe, depends on technology. Technology is helpless without
science; science is impotent without technology. Technology is to science what
performance is to music. The composers who write the score we call scientists;
the musicians who produce the performance we call engineers. The distinction
is unclear-and unimportant.
What is important is that the industrial and social developments that re-
sult from advances in technology and science have vastly improved the human
19841
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situation. Seventy-five years ago an industrial worker needed three full years
of steady employment to earn the $750 that was the original price of the
Model T Ford. The worker then had no assurance of steady employment, and
no fringe benefits, such as social security, pension, health insurance, sickness
pay, unemployment compensation, workmen's compensation, or extra pay for
overtime. The worker of today works one-third fewer hours, has all the fringe
benefits mentioned, and earns $30,000 a year, or enough to buy five new cars,
representing an increase in real wages of more than forty times in about three-
quarters of a century.' In the large, fully-unionized mass production indus-
tries, wages are even higher. This is sometimes said to be the result of an
increase in labor productivity, but Professor Peter Drucker says it was entirely
due to better machines and tools, higher capital investment, and improved in-
dustrial management.6 Regardless of how described, the improvement clearly
rests upon technology.
Accompanying the advance in material welfare, has come a vastly en-
larged area of choice-an increase in personal liberty for virtually everyone.
The range of choice in material goods is obvious; advertising will not let us
forget it no matter how we try. Less noticed is the increase in range of choices
of living conditions and of ideas offered by the proliferation of facilities for
transportation and communication. The rich travel by jet planes, as do many
who are not rich. The summer roads are crowded with the cars of ordinary
citizens traveling across the continent, some with tents, trailers, or campers,
others with boats of all kinds and sizes in tow.
The proliferation of communications media is even more significant.
Broadcasting, which began little more than half a century ago, has become the
dominant mass medium. In 1927, when federal regulation of broadcasting be-
gan, there were 681 radio stations on the air,' but by 1934 the number had
been reduced to 583 because the spectrum could not accomodate more without
undue interference between stations.5 Television began in 1941 with just two
stations.9 It developed little during the war, but by 1954 there were 356 televi-
sion stations.' 0 By the end of 1983 the limited spectrum had been expanded by
technology so that there were over 10,000 radio stations, more than half of
which were FM stations which take considerably more spectrum space than
5. Drucker, Quality Education; The New Growth Area, Wall St. J., July 19,
1983, at 26, col. 3. The figures given, and those following, can also be calculated by
comparing currently reported statistics with those from the BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES. There is some variation in the data,
depending upon the sources used, but the general comparisons and conclusions are not
significantly affected.
6. Id.
7. C. STERLING & T. HAIGHT, MASS MEDIA: ASPEN INSTITUTE GUIDE TO
COMMUNICATION TRENDS 43 (1978).
8. Id.
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the AM stations that were the broadcasting pioneers."' In addition, there were
over 1,400 television stations which require even broader spectrum allocations
than FM stations, 2 plus more than 6,400 FM and TV translators, which are
low power repeater stations that bring radio and television to small communi-
ties with poor reception." Further, there were over 400 Low Power Television
stations serving local areas, with some 25,000 applications for additional low
power TV authorizations on file and awaiting action by the FCC.' 4 Cable tele-
vision, which is capable of bringing dozens of communications channels into
each home, now reaches 40 percent of the households in the country, and is
continuing to expand.' 5
Already developed by technology and awaiting only the removal of gov-
ernment obstacles to operation, are hundreds of low power television stations,
multichannel, multipoint distribution systems, direct-to-home satellite broad-
casting systems, satellite delivered master antenna television systems, and
other variants of the burgeoning electronic technologies.' 6 Videotapes of mo-
tion pictures can be purchased or rented and displayed on home television sets
at the customer's convenience. Records and tapes of incredibly high fidelity
are available to bring the performances of the world's greatest musical artists,
as well as lesser performers and other audio messages into the home. Radios
can be carried about, slipped into the pocket, or worn inside headphones on
the ears. Publications multiply, serving every specialized occupational group
and every conceivable idiosyncratic taste-as well as some that seem incon-
ceivable to the normal person-so that there are now some 14,000 special in-
terest magazines in the country.
Everyone who has a thought to express can find a medium in which to
express it. If the radio talk shows, the letters to the editor columns of newspa-
pers, and the special interest magazines all refuse, one can still write out a
message and produce multiple copies cheaply on the photocopying machine at
the workplace or at the local library or drugstore. Technology is fast eroding
the mass media markets of television networks and newspaper chains by frag-
menting the audience into segments too numerous to be encompassed by any
medium or enterprise.
While it is necessary to conclude that technology has increased the mate-
rial well being, the social choices and the civil liberties of society in general
and of the average person in particular, it is not the case that progress has
been steady and linear. There are quantum jumps, as when transportation
changes from wagons or canal boats to railroads, then to automobiles and
trucks, and finally to airplanes. Similarly, communications changes from let-
ters delivered by pony express to telegraph and then to telephone. Mass com-




15. Telling Figures, BROADCASTING, Jan. 2, 1984, at 114.
16. The Tide of Deregulation, BROADCASTING, Feb. 20, 1984, at 60.
1984]
5
Loevinger: Loevinger: Earl F. Nelson Lecture: Law, Technology, and Liberty
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
munication changes from the town crier to small newspapers, to large circula-
tion newspapers, then to radio, to television, and to media that we can now
barely discern on the horizon. Correspondingly, social progress has periods of
linear movement, followed by periods of stability; with movements first in one
direction and then another.
With this inconstant course, there are those who fear and warn against
technology, either in general or in some of its aspects. That is not new. In the
early nineteenth century, the Luddite movement opposed the industrialization
of England out of fear that it would deprive them of employment. Today there
are many responsible people who are concerned that advances in computer
technology will endanger our right to privacy. 17 It is feared that the ability of
computers to gather data from any number of diverse sources, classify, record
and retrieve the data from vast data banks will expose virtually everyone to
the possibility of having all personal information become available to others.
However, this raises a most crucial point. The principal threat of such invasion
of privacy comes from government. It is agencies like the Internal Revenue
Service and the FBI that are in the business of gathering vast amounts of
information about multitudes of private citizens. Indeed, private agencies have
neither the power nor the resources to engage in such a costly undertaking.
Thus the threat is not from technology but from government, about which I
shall have more to say.
Another recent fear, although one that is fading now, is that genetic engi-
neering may loose upon the world some awful plague. However, it now appears
that genetic manipulation of plants and animals has been going on both in
nature and by human practice for much longer than was previously realized.
Scientists now assure us there is little danger from such genetic manipulation
and that great benefits are possible. 8
A glaring example of the fear of technology, apparently because of igno-
rance, is the case of nuclear power. Nuclear technology was first developed in
the United States, and following World War II was widely hailed as promising
great benefits from an atoms-for-peace program that would replace the de-
structive powers of the atom bomb with constructive uses. Nuclear power was
to be a principal part of such benevolent use. Starting about 1957 with an
experimental plant at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, nuclear power has now de-
veloped to supply about 13% of the electrical energy of the U.S. However,
delays in construction caused in substantial part by constantly changing gov-
ernment regulations and somewhat more by litigation of those opposed to the
whole idea of nuclear power, have caused the cancellation of some nuclear
plants under construction and the abandonment of any plans or orders for new
17. See, e.g., Quade, Privacy in Peril - Technology and government erode pro-
tections, 69 A.B.A. J. 565 (1983).
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plants in this country since 1978.19 Other countries are not so inhibited.
France produces 48% of its electricity by nuclear power, and plans to produce
90% by 1990.12 Belgium produces 45% of its electric power from nuclear
plants, Sweden, Finland and Taiwan 40%, and Britain 16% which it expects to
raise to 20% by the end of 1984.
Time reports that one of the industry failures which is partially responsi-
ble for nuclear power difficulties in this country is the failure to follow the lead
of other countries that have adopted standardized reactor designs. 2 What the
report fails to note is that a principal reason the industry has not developed or
adopted standardized reactor designs is that government antitrust enforcement
agencies have almost foreclosed the possibility for fear that it might lead to
monopolistic procurement practices. Time also reports that Japan, which now
gets 19% of its electricity from nuclear power, has 24 reactors in operation, 13
under construction and seven more planned.2 2 It comments, "The Japanese
can build a typical nuclear plant within seven years, while in the U.S. the time
needed can be as much as 14 years. One reason for the difference [is] Japan's
relatively simple, efficient legal system makes it hard for nuclear opponents to
bottle up projects with court challenges.'
One of the underlying reasons for the anti-nuclear phobia is disclosed by
a public opinion survey based on accepted content analysis and survey re-
search techniques. This disclosed that over 90% of knowledgeable scientists in
the field believe that we need and should proceed rapidly to develop nuclear
energy sources, but newspaper reporters, and, even more, broadcast journal-
ists, are predominantly hostile to this possibility. 24 The Washington Post,
which has a strong liberal orientation and has generally been sympathic to
protest movements of all kinds, comments editorially:
A well-built and well-run reactor is among the safest and cleanest of all de-
vices for generating electricity. By comparison, coal-fired plants, on which this
country now depends for more than half of its electricity, are highly hazard-
ous. Burning large amounts of coal creates a kind of air pollution that kills
people. Every year the lives of several thousand Americans are, as the statisti-
cians carefully put it, prematurely shortened by the pollution from coal plant
stacks. To shift more of the power load to reactors would benefit the environ-
ment and human health. 25
The problems of nuclear power, which seem so dramatic and are so
19. See Stoler, Pulling the Nuclear Plug, TIME, Feb. 13, 1984, at 34; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 28, 1984, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
20. See Alexander, From Paris to Peking, Fission Is Still in Fashion, TIME,
Feb. 13, 1984, at 44. This article also contains the data for the other countries referred
to in the text.
21. See Stoler, supra note 18, at 38, 42.
22. Id. at 45.
23. Id.
24. Rothman & Lichter, The Nuclear Energy Debate: Scientists, The Media,
and the Public, PUB. OPINION, Aug./Sept. 1982, at 47.
25. Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1982, at A18, col. 1.
1984]
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widely publicized today, are only a few of the most recent of the many uneasy
interactions between law on the one hand and science and technology on the
other. Since the confrontation between Galileo and the church-which then
represented the law-in the early seventeenth century, the law has sought to
control science and technology. In the case of Galileo, the issue was whether
truth was to be discovered by empirical observation or by authoritative inter-
pretation of the Bible.26 That issue has been nominally settled with the ceding
to science of the right to seek and proclaim empirical truth while law retains
authority to command and control conduct and sometimes speech. This divi-
sion is not as clear-cut as it sounds. The boundary between the proper fields of
law and science is becoming less distinct, and law, science and technology are
becoming increasingly interwined. As a recent editorial in Science says:
In a technological society, the professional roles of many scientists and engi-
neers become inextricably interwined with those of lawyers, legislators and
regulators. As the use of technology, particularly high technology, expands,
increasing numbers of scientists and engineers will become professionally in-
volved in the legal, legislative, and regulatory affairs of the nation. Advances
in science and technology raise societal issues related to the quality of life of
this and succeeding generations and to the fundamental rights of
individuals. 27
The issue of censorship of scientific and technological speech, far from
being settled, is a current and continuing debate. The publication of the Amer-
ican Association for the Advancement of Science, the broadest-based scientific
organization in this country and probably in the world, accuses government
authorities of suppressing scientific and technological publications, and la-
ments that the "relationships between the government and the scientific and
technical communities continue to be sorely troubled."28 On the other side,
government authorities are concerned about the flow of high technology infor-
mation with possible military applications from this country to Russia, and are
strenuously seeking ways to control such "technology transfer."29 The political
debate continues, with the scientists and technicians arguing that free in-
terchange of ideas is indispensable to technical progress, and government au-
thorities maintaining that it is dangerous to the perpetuation of freedom in
this country to permit a totalitarian power like Russia to acquire the tech-
niques that may enable it to overpower this nation and its allies. No immedi-
ate resolution of this controversy appears imminent, and it will probably con-
tinue for as long as we feel threatened by a foreign power with an alien
26. Gingerich, The Galileo Affair, Sci. AM., Aug. 1982, at 133.
27. Harrison, Scientists and Engineers in the World of Lawyers, Legislators,
and Regulators, 220 Sci. 669 (1983).
28. Carey, Handcuffing Science, 217 Sci. 1207 (1982).
29. Technology Transfer: A Policy Nightmare, Bus. WK, Apr. 4, 1983, at 94;
Boffery, Stemming the Flow of High Technology, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1984, at C2,
col. 3; Anderson, U.S. High Tech Drained Away By the Soviets, Washington Post,
Mar. 19, 1984, at E20, col. 4. Magazines and newspapers continue to carry numerous
reports on this issue.
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Law interacts with technology in many other ways besides restraints on
the publication or flow of information. The patent and copyright laws exert a
powerful influence on the development and dissemination of technology. A
good illustration is the home videotape recorder copyright case.30 There the
owners of copyrights on television programs sued the manufacturers of home
videotape recorders for contributory infringement of their copyrights, on the
grounds that the manufacture and distribution of the home recorders resulted
in the recording of television programs which infringed the copyrights on such
programs. The Supreme Court held that the recording of television programs
by members of the general public was mainly for the purpose of shifting the
time of watching the programs and was fair use. Consequently there was no
copyright infringement and no contributory infringement. Clearly if the deci-
sion had gone the other way, the manufacture of home video tape recorders
would have been severely curtailed or stopped altogether. In a bit of hyperbole,
the Washington Post headlined its analysis of the decision: "Supreme Court
Chooses Not to Stem the Tide of High Technology". 31
Similarly, government laws and regulations limit, and in some cases halt,
the development of new drugs and medications, the establishment of new
transportation facilities, the establishment or extension of energy systems, such
as pipelines and electric power lines, and many other uses of technology. In-
deed, one may plausibly wonder whether such technologies as those of the
steam engine, the automobile and the airplane would have been developed at
all had the full panoply of modern regulations been in effect at the time these
devices were first conceived. But whatever the impact of law may be on the
development of other technologies, its greatest impact on liberty probably
arises from the legal controls imposed on communications.
The relationship of law to communications-the right of speech-is so
complex and has such a long history that it cannot even be summarized
briefly. The entire subject is explored in depth, with analysis of legal, histori-
cal, technical and economic aspects, in a magnificent book entitled "Technolo-
gies of Freedom" by Ithiel de Sola Pool, late professor of political science at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 32 Tracing the recent development of
the "technologies of freedom," Dr. Pool points out that communication, other
than face to face speech, is becoming overwhelmingly electronic. Electronic
communication has, from its beginning, been regulated and controlled by the
government, both here and in other countries.
Systems of regulation that emerged for common carriers and for broad-
casting spectrum that was then thought to be scarce have been imposed on
30. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studio, Inc., 78 L.Ed 2d 574 (1984).
31. Barbash, Supreme Ct. Chooses not to Stem the Tide of High Technology,
Washington Post, Jan. 22, 1984, at A5, col 1.
32. I. DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983) (published by the
Harvard University Press). Dr. Pool tragically died shortly after publication.
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newer electronic technologies that do not require them. The history of the
twentieth century has been one of strengthening the first amendment in appli-
cation to the print media, but what Congress and the courts have done to free
speech in the new media is quite different. Although the laws and regulations
nominally bow in the direction of the first amendment, free speech in broad-
casting has been compromised and curtailed by a host of regulations imposed
by the Federal Communications Commission on broadcast programming, and
by court decisions not only upholding such regulation but, in some cases, re-
quiring the Commission to go further than it proposed to do in exercising con-
trol. While the rationalization for government control of broadcast speech is
the scarcity of spectrum, Dr. Pool argued that the system of broadcast licens-
ing is the cause, not the result, of scarcity. Regulation has discouraged or for-
bidden shared use of a frequency through resale, and has encouraged each
broadcaster to act as a monopolist. Thus, it was policy, not physics that led to
a scarcity of frequencies. 33 Spectrum, like many other resources such as water,
trees and paper, is a limited but plentiful resource, which is squandered and
misused by government regulations.34
What we are witnessing today is a "convergence of modes" of communi-
cations which is blurring the lines between different media. Telephone lines
are now used to send facsimiles of printed pages, and voice messages are car-
ried on telegraph facilities. Both telegraph and telephone are transmitted over
long distances by radio transmission. Most long distance telephone traffic trav-
els by microwave, but most trans-oceanic traffic goes by satellite. Even local
telephone traffic uses wireless transmission for communication to mobile units;
and the number of such units is being multiplied by the development of cellu-
lar systems. 35 Multiplexing allows thousands of messages to be carried over
the same channels, either hard wired or wireless, that formerly could carry
only one or two. Most significantly, the printed and electronic media are con-
verging and beginning to merge.
The process of printing itself has become largely electronic for mass pub-
lications, particularly newspapers. News stories feed not into typewriters but
into computer terminals, are displayed on cathode ray terminals and edited on
the screen. Pages are similarly composed by computers, which then control the
setting of type from which the papers are printed. Computer networks are
already widespread, but they promise to become much more popular. Video-
text and teletext systems, requiring no more expertise to operate than the au-
tomobile or home television set, will bring news, information and advertising of
all kinds into the home. Thus the computer and electronic screen will become
the printing presses of the next century. But the electronic media have never
enjoyed the same first amendment protection as the print media.36 The present
33. I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 31, at 141.
34. Id. at 151.
35. For a non-technical explanation of cellular systems, see id. at 37.
36. See id.; Loevinger, Free Speech Fairness and Fiduciary Duty in Broadcast-
ing, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 278 (1969).
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Congress continues to debate how much to loosen the regulatory shackles of
broadcasting, with the probable result that little or nothing will be done, and
the Supreme Court continues to broaden the interpretation of the first amend-
ment with the reservation that the electronic broadcasting media present "spe-
cial problems."3 7 The resulting problem is well summarized by Professor Pool
in these terms:
Electronic media, as they are coming to be, are dispersed in use and abundant
in supply. They allow for more knowledge, easier access, and freer speech
than were ever enjoyed before. They fit the free practices of print. The char-
acteristics of media shape what is done with them, so one might anticipate
that these technologies of freedom will overwhelm all attempts to control
them. Technology, however, shapes the structure of the battle, but not every
outcome. While the printing press was without doubt the foundation of mod-
ern democracy, the response to the flood of publishing that it brought forth
has been censorship as often as press freedom. In some times and places the
even more capacious new media will open wider the floodgates for discourse,
but in other times and places, in fear of that flood, attempts will be made to
shut the gates.3 8
This, of course, was precisely the peril that Eric Blair-better known as
George Orwell-warned against in his fictional 1984. The Orwell warning was
not against the development and use of technology, but against the aggran-
dizement and abuse of power by those in positions of legal authority. Shortly
after the publication of 1984, Orwell wrote that the dangers we should fear
were "the perversions to which a centralized economy is liable," and the fact
that "totalitarian ideas have taken roots in the minds of intellectuals every-
where." 39 It was Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia that inspired in Orwell
the vision of an ultimate totalitarian tyranny buttressed by technology. 0
Hitler's Germany is gone, although a segment of it, East Germany under Rus-
sian domination, is little better.41 But Russia after Stalin has advanced little
toward freedom for its people. 2 A psychiatrist working for the Russian gov-
ernment is reported to have addressed a Soviet dissident in terms that sound as
though they came straight out of Orwell's dystopia. After Viktor Feinberg had
been committed to a mental hospital in Russia, the psychiatrist said to him:
37. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386, 388
(1969); see also Loevinger supra note 36, at 289.
38. I. POOL, supra note 31.
39. Quoted in Kristol, There'll Never Be a '1984', Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1983, at
30, col. 4.
40. See Trafford, Orwell's "'1984""-Coming True?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 26, 1983/Jan. 2, 1984, at 86.
41. Powell, For a Peek at "1984" Look to East Germany, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 26, 1983/Jan. 2, 1984, at 94.
42. Trafford, supra note 39, at 86. See generally McBee, U.S. Still a Far Cry
From World of "1984", U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 26, 1983/Jan. 2, 1984, at
90; Wellborn, Big Brother's Tools Are Ready, but ... U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 26, 1983/Jan. 2, 1984, at 88.
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Your release depends on your behavior. And your behavior, to us, means your
political views. In all other respects your behavior is perfectly normal. Your
illness consists of dissenting opinions. As soon as you renounce them and
adopt a correct point of view, we will let you go.' 3
Happily the United States, and much of the world, is still far from the
Orwellian nightmare that we can glimpse elsewhere. But we cannot afford to
become complacent or indifferent. Power has a tendency to corrupt, as Acton
observed two centuries ago, and governments have a gravitational attraction
for power. The great liberating movements of Anglo-American history, from
the Magna Carta of 1215 through our own Bill of Rights, incorporated into
the Constitution in 1791, and to the nineteenth amendment of 1920 have been
limitations on the exercise of government powers deemed to be oppressive or
threatening. But during the last half century the political currents have been
turbulent and government actions have reflected conflicting forces and tenden-
cies in society.
American courts, the great bulwarks of liberty, have not been immune
from the tendency to expand the powers of government. A good illustration of
this tendency can be seen by examining cases decided under the federal anti-
trust laws. These make a particularly illuminating study because the basic
statute is the Sherman Act44 which was enacted in 1890 and has remained
unchanged in its operative terms since, and also because it highlights the im-
pact of developing technology on our thinking. The purpose of the law, and the
intent of Congress insofar as there is such a thing, was rather clearly stated by
the proponents of the legislation. In the Senate debate, Senator John Sherman,
who gave his name to the bill, said:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order,
and among them all none is more threatening that the inequality of condition,
of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of
the concentration of capital into vast combinations, to control production and
trade and break down competition. These combinations already defy or con-
trol powerful transportation corporations and reach State authorities ...
They had monopolies and mortmains of old, but never before such giants as in
our day. You must heed [the voters'] appeal or be ready for the socialist, the
communist, and the nihilist. Society is now disturbed by forces never felt
before. . . . If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not
endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the
necessaries of life. If we would not submit to an emperor we should not sub-
mit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the
price of any commodity.45
43. Quoted in Zimbardo, Mind Control in 1984, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan.
1984, at 68, 71.
44. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
(1982).
45. Quoted in H. THORELLI, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 180 (1954). This is
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To express this purpose, the Sherman Act declared in simple terms that every
contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the States, and monopolizing or attempting to monopolize any part of trade or
commerce among the States, were unlawful.4 6 Clearly the statute was aimed
at great and powerful national aggregations of economic power. On final pas-
sage, the bill was approved without a dissenting vote in either house.47
The first case that reached the Supreme Court under the Sherman Act
was a suit to enjoin performance of a contract by which four companies that
produced 98% of the refined sugar in the United States would be consolidated
under common control. The trial court and the court of appeals both ruled
that the Sherman Act was inapplicable because manufacture and commerce
"are two distinct and very different things" and that a monopoly in manufac-
turing does not involve monopoly or restraint of interstate commerce. 48 On
review the Supreme Court, with one justice dissenting, declared that contracts,
combinations or conspiracies to control activities in manufacturing, agricul-
ture, mining or production in any of its forms can have only a indirect effect
on interstate trade and commerce and therefore are not within the scope of the
Federal antitrust laws.4 9 It reasoned that the fact that an article is manufac-
tured for export to another State does not make it an article of interstate com-
merce.8 0 Two years later, the Court held that the antitrust act did apply to
railroads. 51 However, in 1898 the Court reiterated the views expressed in the
sugar trust case, holding that the antitrust act applies only to combinations
which directly affect interstate commerce and therefore the buying and selling
of cattle at the stockyards in Kansas City is not part of commerce, but is
merely incidental to commerce even though the cattle have been shipped from
other states.5 2
In 1899, the Court finally applied the Sherman Act to manufacturers,
holding that a combination among pipe manufacturers to eliminate competi-
tion among them and to fix the prices at which any of them would sell pipe
was illegal under the Act as to all pipe sold outside the state of manufacture.53
The Court reasoned that it is the sale and delivery of pipe, and not the manu-
facture, which is the essential part of the agreement among the defendants,
and a sale for delivery outside the state makes the transaction a part of inter-
state commerce.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
47. H. THORELLI, supra note 42, at 210.
48. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 60 F. 934, 936 (3d Cir. 1894), affg, 60
F. 306 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1894), affid, 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
49. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895).
50. Id. at 13.
51. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 326-27
(1897); see also United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
52. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); Anderson v. United States,
171 U.S. 604 (1898).
53. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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During the first decade of this century about a dozen cases under the
antitrust law reached the Supreme Court, and by 1912 the Court had held
that the packing house trust,54 the Standard Oil trust,55 the American To-
bacco trust, 56 and a combination of manufacturers of 85% of the enamelled
ironware in the country, 57 were all illegal. During the second decade, the
Court also held that the antitrust law outlawed an agreement among 75% of
the book publishers in the country to restrict the sale of books to dealers who
would maintain the retail price,58 the circulation by an association of retail
lumber dealers of lists of wholesalers selling directly to consumers,5 9 the union
circulation of a blacklist of non-union dealers, 0 and a combination of steam-
ship companies which charged a higher rate to shippers who shipped goods by
any company not in the combination.6"
However, in 1920 the Court refused to order the breakup of U.S. Steel,
saying that the mere size of a corporation and its possession of great economic
power are not contrary to the antitrust laws when achieved by lawful and
proper means.62 The same year it held that the making of contracts for adver-
tising in magazines distributed nationally in interstate commerce does not it-
self involve the movement of goods or merchandise or the transmission of in-
telligence in interstate commerce, dnd therefore is not subject to the antitrust
laws. 63 In 1922, the Court held that professional baseball is not subject to the
antitrust laws.64 In an opinion by Justice Holmes for a unanimous court, it was
said that the business of giving baseball exhibitions is a purely local affair,
even though it involves travel by the ball clubs from state to state, since the
travel is merely incidental to the exhibition. Further, the Court reasoned that
baseball involved personal effort or labor, which is not a subject of commerce,
and illustrated the absurdity of the contrary conclusion by pointing out that "a
firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a case, or the Chautauqua
lecture bureau sending out lecturers, does not engage in such commerce be-
cause the lawyer or lecturer goes to another state."65 The Court has adhered
to the result of this case in 195366 and again in 1972,67 although the reasoning
54. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
55. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
56. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
57. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
58. Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n, 231 U.S. 222 (1913).
59. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
60. Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
61. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
62. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
63. Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S.
436 (1920).
64. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
65. Id. at 209.
66. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
67. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). For commentary on the line of base-
ball cases, see Siegfried, Book Review, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 783 (1983) (reviewing J.
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has long since been abandoned or overruled.
A year after the baseball case, the Court held that the Sherman Act did
apply to a combination of theatres which excluded some actors from all thea-
tres controlled by the combination."' Three decades later, a case against defen-
dants engaged in producing, booking, and presenting legitimate theatrical pro-
ductions on a multistate basis was dismissed by a district court on the
authority of the Supreme Court baseball case. However the Supreme Court
reversed, unanimously holding that the conduct of a legitimate theatre busi-
ness on a multistate basis constitutes interstate trade or commerce within the
meaning of the Sherman Act.69 In 1932, the Court held that cleaning and
dyeing is trade within the antitrust meaning of the term, saying, "Wherever
any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of
profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned profes-
sions, it is constantly called a trade . . ." and is such for antitrust purposes.70
After President Roosevelt's effort to "pack" the Supreme Court in the
mid-1930's, the Court became even more sympathetic and accommodating to
the expansion of federal power through the antitrust laws-as well as through
a variety of other statutes and regulations. In 1941, the antitrust laws were
held applicable to an association of designers and manufacturers of women's
dresses which sought to prevent copying of their designs,'71 and to a similar
association of designers and manufacturers of women's hats.72 In the same
year, the Court effectively repudiated the distinction between manufacturing
and commerce which had guided its decisions for the first half century after
passage of the Sherman Act, and held that while manufacturing is not of itself
interstate commerce the shipment of manufactured goods is such commerce,
and therefore, Congress can prohibit the interstate movement of goods which
were produced by employees whose wages and hours of employment did not
conform to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.7'
After this, the distinctions between intrastate and interstate activities, and
between trade and commerce and anything else, while occasionally mentioned,
rapidly lost all importance in antitrust jurisprudence. The business of insur-
ance was held subject to the Sherman Act with the declaration by the Su-
preme Court that "A nationwide business is not deprived of its interstate char-
acter merely because it is built upon sales contracts which are local in
MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981)); Mark-
ham & Teplitz, Siegfried at Bat: Mudville Revisited, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 791 (reply
to Siegfried, supra).
68. Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exch., 262 U.S. 271 (1923).
69. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
70. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932). The
concept of interstate commerce was not involved, since this case arose in the District of
Columbia. See 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
71. Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
72. Millinery Creator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 469 (1941).
73. United- States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)).
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nature." 4 A complaint alleging that local plasterers were engaged in a con-
spiracy to restrain trade in the city of Chicago was held to state a cause of
action under the Sherman Act.7 5 The Court said that where interstate com-
merce ends and local commerce begins is not decisive under the Act, since
wholly local business restraints can produce the forbidden effects.16 Justices
Minton and Douglas dissented, protesting that the "activities complained of
here are wholly intrastate, and the restraint upon interstate commerce, if any,
is so indirect, remote and inconsequential as to be without cffect and wholly
foreign to an intent or purpose to conspire to restrain interstate commerce. '77
Similarly the antitrust exemption which the Court appeared to have
carved out for professional sports in the baseball case, did not long survive the
new view. An antitrust case against promoters of professional boxing matches
on a multistate basis was dismissed by the trial court on the authority of the
baseball case but was reversed by the Supreme Court.78 Professional football
met the same fate, although three justices dissented on the grounds that there
was no principled basis on which to distinguish between professional baseball
and professional football.7 9 More recently, professional basketball8 and soc-
cer8' have been held subject to antitrust jurisdiction, and there can be no
doubt now that all organized professional sports except baseball are subject to
the same rule.
As late as 1952, the Supreme Court held out some hope that the learned
professions would not be swept under the all embracing rule of the antitrust
laws by upholding the dismissal of an antitrust suit against a state medical
society.8 ' In an opinion by Justice Jackson the Court said,
We might observe in passing . . . that there are ethical considerations where
the historic direct relationship between patient and physician is involved
which are quite different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary
commercial matters. This Court has recognized that forms of competition
usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a
profession. 8
74. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 547
(1944).
75. United States v. Employing Plasterer's Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
76. Id. at 189.
77. Id. at 190.
78. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955). Frank-
furter and Minton dissented with Minton saying that boxing is not trade or commerce.
Id. at 248 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 253 (Minton, J., dissenting).
79. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 456 (1957) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
80. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
81. North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d
1249 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
82. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
83. Id. at 336 (citing Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294
U.S. 608 (1935)), which held that a state statute prohibiting certain types of advertis-
ing by dentists was constitutional); cf. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (bar
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This hope survived just a quarter of a century until 1975, when the Court
held that bar associations and lawyers engaged in handling real estate transac-
tions, traditionally regarded as local activities, were subject to antitrust juris-
diction.84 Soon professional engineers were held subject to the antitrust stat-
utes, 85 and there is no doubt left that, regardless of field of specialization or of
the concerns previously voiced by the Court for ethical considerations and pro-
fessional standards, all professional organizations and professionals are subject
to essentially the same antitrust rules as business.8 6 Most antitrust lawyers
representing professional associations no longer even raise the jurisdictional
issue.
Another group that was surprised to find itself subject to ordinary anti-
trust rules was the bankers. In 1963, the Supreme Court found banking sub-
ject to the same rules as other businesses87 and since then there has been a
long string of banking antitrust cases, although Congress has provided some-
what different procedures in such cases.88 A similar group that has been em-
braced by the welcoming but unwelcome arms of the Sherman Act is the
stockbrokers and their organized stock exchanges.89
Perhaps the most surprising of all the jurisdictional territory to which
antitrust hegemony has been extended is that of local government activity. In
1943, the Supreme Court sustained a California statute establishing a market-
ing program for certain agricultural products that certainly had a restrictive
effect upon the distribution of such products." The Court reasoned that there
was nothing in the history of the Sherman Act suggesting "that its purpose
was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature."91 Many years later the same reasoning was applied to activities
association restraint on attorney advertising not subject to attack under Sherman Act,
although such advertising is protected by first amendment).
84. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
85. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978).
86. See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556 (1982).
87. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
88. United States v. Philipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970);
United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); United States v. First Nat'l
Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S.
665 (1964). There have been many more bank antitrust cases which did not reach the
Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeal. See, e.g., United States v. County Nat'l Bank,
339 F. Supp. 85 (D. Vt. 1972); United States v. Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co.,
240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
89. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); see also United
States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (stockbroker defendants
held not subject to the antitrust laws as to the particular activities challenged but anti-
trust jurisdiction was not otherwise questioned).
90. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
91. Id. at 350-51.
1984]
17
Loevinger: Loevinger: Earl F. Nelson Lecture: Law, Technology, and Liberty
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
directed by the supreme court of a state.9" However, the following year the
Court held, by a plurality, that the same rule did not extend to municipalities
established by a state constitution.9 3 Since then, a majority of the Court has
held that the strictures of Sherman Act apply to cities both organized under
and exercising powers granted by state constitution,94 as well as to state agen-
cies not acting under explicit directions of the state legislature.9 How far the
district courts believe the scope of the Sherman Act is extended to local gov-
ernment units is indicated by a recent case holding that an agreement between
a county and a village to deny sewer connections to a proposed land develop-
ment is an actionable restraint of trade and that the annexation of land by a
village is trade or commerce within the meaning of the antitrust laws.9 9
With municipal land annexation now a subject of antitrust concern, it is
not surprising that a court of appeals has held that the location of a football
team which moved from one city to another may similarly be subject to anti-
trust scrutiny and liability if it appears unreasonable (or otherwise displeas-
ing) to a jury.9 7
The encompassing scope of the Supreme Court approach to antitrust law
today is indicated by the language of its decision in a case holding that a
combination of real estate brokers engaged in selling residential properties in
the city of New Orleans is subject to the Sherman Act.9" The Chief Justice,
speaking for the Court said:
The broad authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause has, of
course, long been interpreted to extend beyond activities actually in interstate
commerce to reach other activities that, while wholly local in nature, never-
theless substantially affect interstate commerce.. . . During the near century
of Sherman Act experience, forms and modes of business and commerce have
changed along with changes in communication and travel, and innovations in
methods of conducting particular businesses have altered relationships in
commerce. Application of the Act reflects an adapatation to these changing
circumstances .
Ultimately, whatever stimulates or retards the volume of residential
sales, or has an impact on the purchase price, affects the demand for financ-
ing and title insurance, those two commercial activities that on this record are
shown to have occurred in interstate commerce. 99
92. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
93. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
94. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
95. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminium, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980).
96. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 1984-1 Trade Cases 1 65,883 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
97. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726
F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
98. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
99. Id. at 241 (emphasis in original).
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If this suggests that there is virtually no activity with any commercial
aspect occuring within the United States that is not subject to the Sherman
Act under the prevailing judicial view, that conclusion is borne out by review
of the activities that have been subjected to antitrust jurisdiction. In addition
to those already mentioned, the antitrust laws have been held applicable to
grocery store chains,1"' hospital construction,' 0' Blue Shield health care
plans, 0 2 newspaper publishing,' newspaper distribution,' 0 4 poultry breed-
ing,10 5 and the distribution of prayer books.10 6
A different but related aspect of antitrust growth is its extraterritorial
extension. It would unduly prolong this discussion to examine that aspect, but
it may be of interest to note how far it has taken the courts. Many foreign
countries, particularly Great Britain and some of the British Commonwealth
countries, strenuously object to American efforts to give antitrust laws extra-
territorial application, especially where foreign nationals are involved. This be-
came of concern to American courts when Laker Airways, an insolvent British
airline, brought an antitrust suit in the District of Columbia against a number
of foreign airlines, which thereupon brought a suit in a British court to prevent
Laker from prosecuting its American lawsuit. The District of Columbia dis-
trict court then enjoined the foreign airlines from prosecuting their case in a
British court, and this injunction was sustained by the Court of Appeals
mainly on the grounds of the importance of American antitrust policy. 10 7 How
this complex conflict of jurisdictions will ultimately be resolved remains to be
seen.
Press reports suggest that there is a change taking place in antitrust en-
forcement policy, which is becoming less aggressive. But this may be more
illusory than real. Two of the cases that have attracted much attention re-
cently are the AT&T divestiture case and the LTV-Republic Steel merger.
While these two cases seem to be entirely different, in fact they are quite
similar as far as antitrust policy is concerned. In both situations two major
industries are being restructured by private negotiation and agreement be-
tween the parties and the Antitrust Division rather than by litigation, 08 which
now appears to be reserved for small violators of the antitrust per se proscrip-
100. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
101. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
102. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
103. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
104. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
105. National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978).
106. Costello Publishing Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
107. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 1983-1 Trade Cases 1 65,885 (D.C. Cir.,
1984). One panel judge dissented from the opinion. Id. at 956 (Starr, J., dissenting);
see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 112 Daily Wash. Law Re-
porter 433 (Mar. 5, 1984) (D.D.C. 1983).
108. See 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 577 (BNA March 3, 1984) for a re-
port of the LTV-Republic restructuring. The literature on the AT&T restructuring is
so voluminous that citation is unnecessary and would be futile.
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tions. This manner of exercising government control is more typical of the
regulatory process than of the law enforcement process that has previously
characterized application of the antitrust laws. Whether this approach will be
more or less effective only time will tell, but clearly it is not what Congress
had in mind in 1890.109 One thing does seem to be obvious already, and that is
that in the AT&T case the result will be that, at least in the near future, the
public will get worse service at a higher price. However, the point of interest
here is that, whatever procedure is adopted, the principle of expanding govern-
ment power has not been abandoned. In any event, by far the great preponder-
ance of antitrust lawsuits a;e private actions, and the courts do not seem to
have changed their attitude in response to the reported shift in enforcement
emphasis.1
This cursory history refers to only a small fraction of the more than two
thousand Supreme Court decisions involving the antitrust laws, not to mention
the thousands more that have been decided by the lower courts. However, even
this small application of the law has expanded beyond the original purpose of
the Congress which enacted it to control the giant aggregations of economic
power that were developing at the end of the nineteenth century as an out-
growth of the Industrial Revolution. This does not necessarily demonstrate
that any specific case was wrongly decided on the basis of the legal principles
and the circumstances prevailing at the time of the decision, although the wis-
dom of some of the decisions may be questioned. However, it does illustrate
the tendency of government power to expand continuously regardless of origi-
nal purpose or ostensible limitations.
In some respects law and technology have followed similar courses in
modern times. Both have followed the path of organic growth and evolution
from fairly small and simple forms to much larger and more complex orga-
nisms. Paradoxically, both have also obeyed the second law of thermodynamics
in moving continuously toward greater chaos. To some extent this growth has
been fueled by a blind faith in the power of institutions to solve problems and
deliver happiness to the individual-as the advertisers continuously promise
us. In the past, we have believed that every problem has a technological solu-
tion; although now some are beginning to realize that every technological solu-
tion has a problem. Similarly, Daniel Boorstin says, one of the most dangerous
popular fallacies is that democracy is attainable."'
American democracy, properly speaking, has been a process and not a prod-
uct, a quest and not a discovery. .... In human history in the long run there
are no solutions, only problems. .... Every seeming solution is a new prob-
lem ....
109. H. THORELLI, supra note 45, at 229-30.
110. In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2378 (1984), the
Supreme'Court declined to accept the suggestion of the Solicitor General and several
other amici to reconsider the application of the per se rule to resale price maintenance.
Id. at 4343 n.7.
111. D. BOORSTIN, DEMOCRACY AND ITs DISCONTENTS 120 (5th ed. 1975).
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The most distinctive feature of our system is not a system, but a quest,
not a neat arrangement of men and institutions, but a flux. 1 2
One of the most threatening of the delusions of solutions is the notion that
for every social problem there is a legal fix. This has resulted in an explosion
of litigation, legislation, and regulation that has aroused an outcry in both the
professional and popular press."' The Chief Justice of the United States has
added a relatively restrained criticism of the bar, noting that many lawyers
persist in filing frivolous and absurd lawsuits, often over trivial grievances." 4
The law schools also must share some of the blame as they persist in grinding
out embryo lawyers regardless of need or demand, and despite the fact that
the market is now glutted with some 650,000 lawyers, more than any other
country in the world on a per capita or any other basis, and accounting for
two-thirds of all the lawyers in the world, although we have only about six
percent of the world's population. Sadly, many of these law school graduates
will never find real employment as lawyers," 5 although enough of them will be
admitted to the bar to keep the courts overworked and the public unhappy.
The proliferation of law and lawyers has been not only beyond necessity but
even beyond utility.
Probably the worst result of the increasing flood of lawyers and lawsuits
has been the increasing pressure on the courts to expand the limits of tradi-
tional legal principles to respond to the strident demands made upon them.
Despite the clear intention of the Constitution to establish a federal govern-
ment of limited power, there is no activity in the United States today that is
beyond the legal power of the federal government, if it seeks to reach that
activity in a technically acceptable manner. There seems to be no activity that
someone somewhere does not want to have the federal government control for
some purpose; and there is always a lawyer willing to help. No doubt many of
the purposes are benign, some even noble. Certainly the good intentions of the
legislators, executives and judges responsible for promulgating and applying
the laws cannot be doubted. However, we must remember that throughout
history tyrants have proclaimed worthy objectives as the reason for their tyr-
annies. The inquisitors did not torture and burn their victims because of sadis-
tic satisfaction in watching the suffering of others but because of an avowed,
and probably sincere, concern to save the souls of heretics. The ancients used
battle, ordeal, and torture as a means of determining legal disputes not be-
cause of a desire to harm others (although they seemed remarkably indifferent
to that) but because they believed that this was the way to invoke divine inter-
112. Id. at 121-22.
113. See, e.g., Want, The Caseload Monster in the Federal Courts, 69 A.B.A. J.
612 (1983); More Laws, More Lawyers, Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1984, at 34, col. 1.
114. Chief Justice Burger's speech of February 12, 1984, to the American Bar
Association was widely reported in the press. See, e.g., Margolick, Burger Says Law-
yers Make Legal Help Too Costly, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1984, at A13, col. 1.
115. See Lewin, Business and the Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1984, at D2, col. 1.
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vention as a guide to truth and justice.116 Today we condemn the cruel oppres-
sions of the masters of the Kremlin, but they are even more vociferous in de-
claring that they do only what is necessary to serve the interests of the
working class masses of the world and to protect the common people against
those who would enslave them. We cannot judge their sincerity, but we can
observe that their power over the people is increasingly centralized, is wielded
cruelly, and that liberty languishes regardless of the objectives of those who
attack it.
In contrast to law which, in general, increases liberty only as it imposes
limitations on itself, that is, on the governments and governors who wield its
power, technology has a natural tendency to disperse power to greater num-
bers of individuals and to increase both the welfare and the liberty of the
societies that cultivate it. This can be observed in the correlation of the indus-
trialized societies and the free nations of the world. About one-third of the
world's population resides in countries where they enjoy both political rights
and civil liberties. Over forty percent of the world's population lives in coun-
tries that are not free; and about one fourth lives in countries that are partly
free. 1 7 By no coincidence the free countries are the industrialized and techno-
logically advanced countries of North America, Europe, Japan, and some of
the Central South American and Caribbean countries. The not-free countries
are mainland China, Russia, and many in Africa and Asia which lag in the
development of technology and industry. Partly free countries include most of
the remainder of those in Africa and Asia.
Ultimately, liberty must arise from the hearts of a free people. The spirit
of liberty is the spirit of free inquiry and free discourse; the spirit that rejects
absolutes and authoritarian or authoritative answers and official dogma. This
is also the spirit of science and of technology, the child of science. No doubt
the material contributions of technology provide conditions which foster lib-
erty; but they cannot create it. It is the kinship of the spirit of science and the
spirit of liberty that encourages both to flourish in the same soil.
Ultimately science and technology represent mainfestations of the human
impulse to explore, to learn, to build; and they grow out of the spirit of reason,
of inquiry and of skepticism. Law, on the other hand, represents the search for
order and restraint. This is surely necessary in an increasingly crowded and
complex world. But law tends to be increasingly centralized, with more and
more government power held in the hands of a few. It is in the nature of
science and technology, in contrast, that they will be practiced by an increas-
ing number of individuals and institutions, as has in fact happened in this
116. See H. LEA, SUPERSTITION AND FORCE (1878).
117. FREEDOM AT ISSUE, (Jan.-Feb. 1984); R. GASTIL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD,
POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 1983-1984. Both are publications of Freedom
House, 20 West 40th St., New York, N.Y. 10018, a nonpartisan organization engaged
in examining and reporting on the condition of freedom in all the countries of the
world. The references mentioned contain a detailed description of the status of political
rights and civil liberties in every nation.
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country and throughout the world. Thus, it is the spirit of science which is
more congenial to the spirit of liberty than the spirit of law.
Although put in different and far more eloquent terms, a similar thought
was voiced by one of our greatest judges, Learned Hand, in addressing a group
of new citizens during World War II:
What do we mean when we say that first of all we seek liberty? I often won-
der whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws
and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes.
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitu-
tion, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs
no constitution, no law, no court to save it. ...
What then is the spirit of liberty? I cannot define it; I can only tell you
my own faith. The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is
right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to understand the minds of
other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which weighs their
interests alongside its own without bias; the spirit of liberty remembers that
not even a sparrow falls to earth unheeded; the spirit of liberty is the spirit of
Him who, near two thousand years ago, taught mankind a lesson it has never
learned, but has never quite forgotten; that there may be a kingdom where
the least shall be heard and considered side by side with the greatest." 8
118. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (2d ed. 1953). The quotation is
from a speech delivered in 1944.
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